David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 98 (1):15-34 (2000)
It is widely held by philosophers of action that an agent does something intentionally only if he does it either as an end or as a means to an end. We are, however, strongly inclined to describe certain doings as intentional despite the apparent failure of this condition to be met. Can we explain the intentionalness of these doings without committing ourselves to saying that agents do all sorts of things intentionally which they manifestly do not?
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