David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering, summarizing and aggregating diﬀuse information by governments and businesses alike. Critics worry that these markets are susceptible to price manipulation by agents who wish to distort decision making. We study the eﬀect of manipulators on an experimental market, and ﬁnd that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy. Subjects without manipulation incentives compensate for the bias in oﬀers from manipulators by setting a diﬀerent threshold at which they are willing to accept trades
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