David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (2):273 - 301 (2008)
The paper tries to provide an alternative to Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, it compares this reconstruction with the approaches of J. Woodward and C. Hitchcock, C. Liu and with the views of M. Thalos on analytic mechanics.
|Keywords||D-N model Underlying structure Initial conditions Idealizations Modification conditions Explanation by gradual concretization Phenomena as appearances/manifestations Laws of appearances/manifestations General/singular appearances/manifestations Humean type causal law Idealized type of a law Scientific laws of the causal type C. G. Hempel J. Woodward C. Hitchcock C. Liu M. Thalos|
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