David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a (2012)
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
J. L. Austin (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press.
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Emma Borg (2004). Minimal Semantics. Oxford University Press.
Alice Crary (2007). Beyond Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alice Crary (2002). The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words. Inquiry 45 (1):59 – 80.
C. J. L. Talmage (1994). Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning. Erkenntnis 40 (2):213 - 225.
Andrei Marmor (2008). Is Literal Meaning Conventional? Topoi 27 (1-2):101-113.
John Michael McGuire (2007). Malapropisms and Davidson's Theories of Literal Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:93-97.
Andrew Munro (2013). Reading Austin Rhetorically. Philosophy and Rhetoric 46 (1):22-43.
Jennifer Hornsby & Guy Longworth (eds.) (2006). Reading Philosophy of Language: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary. Blackwell Pub..
Michael Durrant & Charles Sayward (1967). Austin On Whether Every Proposition Has A Contradictory. Analysis 27 (April):167-170.
Eva Feder Kittay (1984). The Identification of Metaphor. Synthese 58 (2):153 - 202.
François Recanati (2006). Predelli and García-Carpintero on "Literal Meaning" (Predelli y García-Carpintero Sobre Literal Meaning). Crítica 38 (112):69 - 79.
Stefano Predelli (2006). The Automatic and the Incomplete. Remarks on Recanati's Literal Meaning (Lo Automático y Lo Incompleto. Comentarios a Literal Meaning de Recanati). Crítica 38 (112):21 - 33.
Christopher G. Framarin (2005). Taking Desirelessness () Seriously. Asian Philosophy 15 (2):143 – 155.
Michael Kremer (2008). Review of Gottlob Frege, Dale Jacquette (Tr.), The Foundations of Arithmetic. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
Added to index2011-11-01
Total downloads91 ( #12,840 of 1,098,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #114,620 of 1,098,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?