J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a (2012)
Abstract
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Nat Hansen, J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Emma Borg (2004). Minimal Semantics. Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
John Michael McGuire (2007). Malapropisms and Davidson's Theories of Literal Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:93-97.
Andrew Munro (2013). Reading Austin Rhetorically. Philosophy and Rhetoric 46 (1):22-43.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-11-01

Total downloads

91 ( #13,712 of 1,102,981 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #183,254 of 1,102,981 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.