Lange on essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85 (2005)
Abstract
Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is - with minor modification - compatible with essentialism.
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References found in this work BETA
By Toby Handfield (2004). Counterlegals and Necessary Laws. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402–419.
Citations of this work BETA
John Roberts (2010). Some Laws of Nature Are Metaphysically Contingent. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
Barbara Vetter (2011). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):83 - 86.
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