Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223 (2011)
In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00377.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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David Landy (2013). What Incongruent Counterparts Show. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):507-524.

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