|Abstract||All too often when philosophers talk and write about sentences they have in mind only indicative sentences, that is, sentences that are true or false and that are normally used in the performance of assertions. When interrogative sentences are mentioned at all it is usually either in the form of a gesture toward some extension of the account of indicatives or an acknowledgment of the limitations of such an account. For example, in the final two sentences of his influential paper “Truth and Meaning” (1967) Donald Davidson remarks.|
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