Reasons for Belief

Abstract
Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While I focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Brandom (1997). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):189 - 204.

    View all 34 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.

    View all 6 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 13--33.
    Mark Schroeder (2011). What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 201--22.
    Thomas Scanlon (2007). Structural Irrationality. In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.
    Jeff Malpas (2008). On Not Giving Up the World - Davidson and the Grounds of Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    107 ( #7,848 of 1,088,905 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    11 ( #10,075 of 1,088,905 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.