David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318 (2006)
Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While I focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
Robert Brandom (1997). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):189 - 204.
Robert B. Brandom (1996). Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kathrin Glüer (2009). In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
Niels Skovgaard Olsen (2010). Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):510-538.
Refeng Tang (2010). Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given. Synthese 175 (1):101 - 122.
Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.
Similar books and articles
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 13--33.
Cheryl K. Chen (2006). Empirical Content and Rational Constraint. Inquiry 49 (3):242 – 264.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Jeff Malpas (2008). On Not Giving Up the World - Davidson and the Grounds of Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.
Thomas Scanlon (2007). Structural Irrationality. In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.
Richard N. Manning (2003). Interpretation, Reasons, and Facts. Inquiry 46 (3):346-376.
David Michael Levin (1969). Reasons and Religious Belief. Inquiry 12 (1-4):371 – 393.
Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Mark Schroeder (2011). What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 201--22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads145 ( #6,625 of 1,140,341 )
Recent downloads (6 months)27 ( #6,946 of 1,140,341 )
How can I increase my downloads?