David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318 (2006)
Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While I focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kathrin Glüer (2009). In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
Ian Schnee (forthcoming). Basic Factive Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.
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