Reversing the Levi identity

Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669 (1993)
The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an intuitively plausible way of revising one's beliefs. Since it typically involves the temporary acceptance of an inconsistent set of beliefs, it can only be used in belief representations that distinguish between different inconsistent sets of belief
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01054039
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
André Fuhrmann (1991). Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson (1994). A Survey of Multiple Contractions. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
Sven Hansson (1997). Semi-Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 7 (1-2):151-175.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

15 ( #175,574 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.