Some Light on Double Effect

Analysis 35 (5):147 - 151 (1975)
Defenders of categorically exceptionless rights sometimes rely on a principle of double effect to maintain their position. But critics of a principle of double effect charge that it admits sophistical solutions to many moral dilemmas. I try to meet this criticism (1) by offering a more precisely formulated principle of double effect than its critics usually consider and (2) by showing that this formulation need not lead to sophistical normative judgments. In sketching my tentative defense of a principle of double effect I indicate the importance of a carefully worked out theory of act individuation
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DOI 10.1093/analys/35.5.147
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