David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150 (2008)
Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often rely on appeals to controversial intuitions involving obscure concepts. While retributive intuitions can be compelling, some worry that the justificatory challenge cannot be met merely by appealing to them. ER tries to enhance the clarity and justificatory power of these intuitions and the concepts they invoke by appealing to an expressive conception of punishment. I argue that these theories fail to justify punishment and that there is reason to think that they cannot, in principle, justify punishment.
|Keywords||Law Logic Political Science Social Sciences, general Philosophy of Law Law Theory/Law Philosophy|
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Citations of this work BETA
Nathan Hanna (2009). The Passions of Punishment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):232-250.
Jules Holroyd (2010). The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):343-371.
Nathan Hanna (2009). Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):325-349.
Bill Wringe (2012). Collective Agents and Communicative Theories of Punishment. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (4):436-456.
Nathan Hanna (2014). Facing the Consequences. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):589-604.
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