Two Claims About Desert

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):41-56 (2013)
Abstract Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at our disposal – one that may lend our intuitions more credibility
Keywords desert  retributivism
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    Gillian Brock (1999). Just Deserts and Needs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):165-188.
    Stephen Kershnar (2008). Desert Tracks Character Alone. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
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