David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 30 (December):395-434 (1987)
This article selectively surveys recent work touching consciousness. It discusses some recent arguments and positions with a view to throwing light on a working principle of much influential philosophical psychology, namely that the first?person point of view is theoretically redundant. The discussion is divided under a number of headings corresponding to specific functions that have been attributed to the first?person viewpoint, from the experience of something it is like to undergo physical processes, to the presence of selfhood, mental substance, meaning, understanding, and value. Arguments indicating limitations of the working principle are adduced, as well as arguments indicating possible exploitations of those limitations by first?personalist positions. Although some of the latter also have limitations, the direction in which the examination tends is that of a progressive widening of the concept of consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Mind Selfhood Soul|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (2008/1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Springer.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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