The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the biff?

Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68 (2008)
Abstract
This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.
Keywords Causation  Causal models  Processes  Counterfactuals  Preëmption
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Toby Handfield, The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the biff?
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Phil Dowe (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge University Press.
Eric Hiddleston (2005). Causal Powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):27-59.

View all 17 references

Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

65 ( #23,254 of 1,102,932 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #24,648 of 1,102,932 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.