David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919 (2013)
This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some questions that contextualism leaves open, particularly why the concept of knowledge is valuable, why the word ‘knows’ exhibits context-variability, and why this term enjoys such widespread use. Finally, I show how my contextualist framework accommodates plausible ideas from two rival views: subject-sensitive invariantism and insensitive invariantism. This provides new support for contextualism and develops this view in a way that improves our understanding of the concept of knowledge.
|Keywords||contextualism knowledge practical explication epistemology Edward Craig|
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Hannon (2015). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):116-139.
Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
Michael Hannon (2015). The Universal Core of Knowledge. Synthese 192 (3):769-786.
Robin McKenna (2014). Normative Scorekeeping. Synthese 191 (3):607-625.
Robin McKenna (2015). Contextualism in Epistemology. Analysis 75 (3):489-503.
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