David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:159-167 (2000)
Both indignation, and sometimes shame, can be considered moral emotions because whoever feels them needs a sense of moral values and distinctions, and a grasp of what is correct and incorrect, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. However, there are differences in the moral aspects associated with each. Shame is related to self-respect and, sometimes, for this to be upheld, something moral is considered necessary. But shame, unlike indignation, is not moral in the sense of being other-regarding. The person who becomes indignant acknowledges the violations of the rights of others and their suffering. The focus here will be on explicating shame and indignation as emotions that require concepts, beliefs and desires related to morality
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