The Simple Paradoxes of Validity and Bradwardinian-Buridanian Semantics

Studia Neoaristotelica 7 (2):116-160 (2010)
Abstract
This paper deals with the simple paradoxes of validity and with the possibility of solving them in terms of Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics. The paradoxes of validity as conceived here are cases of semantic pathology, which result due to the use of terms signifying the validity of inference. Semantic paradoxes are a semantico-epistemological phenomenon which is a symptom of the need to revise several apparently acceptable semantic assumptions. The analysis of possible solutions to the paradoxes focuses on Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics and as a result on the closed, token-based semantic theories that assume the existence of an implicit meaning of propositions. The key theses, as far as the solution to the paradoxes is concerned, are the principle of truth-implication which claims that every proposition expresses or implies its own truth and the closure principle which claims that every proposition asserts or expresses everything that follows from it logically. The present paper advances on recent research in claiming that (with certain reservations) the application of these principles can effectively solve inconsistency-paradoxes but not indeterminacy-paradoxes of validity.Haec dissertatio circa simplices “consequentias insolubiles” modumque eos solvendi iuxta doctrinam semanticam Bradwardiniano-Buridanianam versatur. Consequentiae insolubiles, quae hic considerantur, “pathologiam semanticam” exhibunt, quae ex usu terminorum validitatem consequentiae significantium resultat. Insolubilia ut phaenomenon semantico-epistemologicum necessitatem corrigendi nonnula principia semantica, quae secundum primam suiapparentiam bona esse videntur. Inquisitio in divorsos modos solvendi ista insolubilia praecipue doctrinas semanticas Thomae de Bradwardino Ioannisque Buridani respicit, scilicet doc trinas semanticas “clausas” (seu distinctionem inter “meta-linguam” et “linguam obiectualem” non ponentes), nominalisticas, propositionibus etiam significationem quandam “implicitam” ascribentes. Assertiones principales, ex quibus huiusmodi insolubilium solutio pendet, sunt duo: 1. ex omni propositione assertionem sequi sui ipsius veritatis; 2. omnem propositionem quodcumque ex ea logice sequatur asserere. Extendentes investigationem recentiorum conclusionem tractatione nostra defendimus, principiis praedictis adhibendis bene solvi posse consequentias insolubiles ratione inconsistentiae, non tamen consequentias insolubiles ratione indeterminationis
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