Why are killing and letting die wrong?

Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175–201 (1995)
Abstract
This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that killing and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of why killing and letting die are prima facie objectionable. I also briefly explore some related matters.
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