Why are killing and letting die wrong?

Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175–201 (1995)
This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that <span class='Hi'>killing</span> and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of why <span class='Hi'>killing</span> and letting die are prima facie objectionable. I also briefly explore some related matters.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1088-4963.1995.tb00028.x
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