When Do Extraordinary Claims Give Extraordinary Evidence?
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Berit Brogaard
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James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
| Abstract |
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But on uninteresting topics, surprising claims usually are surprising evidence; we rarely make claims without suffi- cient evidence. On interesting topics, however, we can have interests in exaggerating or downplaying our evidence, and our actions often deviate from our interests. In a simple model of noisy humans reporting on extraordinary evidence, we find that extraordinary claims from low noise people are extraordinary evidence, but such claims from high noise people are not; their claims are more likely unusual noise than unusual truth. When people are organized into a reporting chain, noise levels grow exponentially with chain length; long chains seem incapable of communicating extraordinary evidence
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Robert Greg Cavin (1995). Is There Sufficient Historical Evidence to Establish the Resurrection of Jesus? Faith and Philosophy 12 (3):361-379.
Kent W. Staley (2004). Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):467-488.
Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
Anne D. Birdwhistell (1989). Transition to Neo-Confucianism: Shao Yung on Knowledge and Symbols of Reality. Stanford University Press.
Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
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Clifton Perry (1983). Ordinary, Extraordinary and Neutral Medical Treatment. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 4 (1).
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