David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 51 (October):421-430 (1976)
The question arises from recent arguments, including one by G. E. M. Anscombe, which hold that a belief in one's ability to choose one's actions is incompatible with a causal account of the world. For, if one's arguments deny either choice or causal sequences, how can one account for human control of actions? If to control one's actions means to work to cause some chosen end, and if either point of the argument were correct, how could anyone ever control one's actions at all? Yet we must be able to control actions if we are to seek out and select from evidence or develop any kind of conceptual scheme. I want to develop this necessity-of-control notion to show that arguments such as those advanced by Miss Anscombe are incoherent and to show that we must retain our notion of choice while giving a causal account of the world. I will argue that deterministic sequences and the notions of choice and control go together: in order for us to have a tenable explanation of the world we must be able to talk about choice and control and we must identify and use predictable deterministic sequences in our acting and choosing. I shall argue that we can retain both causal explanation and choice only by employing two different conceptions of causal agency: merely physical agency and the voluntary agency of embodied actors
|Keywords||Cause Choice Compatibilism Determinism Free Will Indeterminism Metaphysics Anscombe, G|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Timothy O'Connor (ed.) (1995). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
Gregory Harding (1997). Free Will and Determinism: Why Compatibilism is False. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.
Helen Steward (2009). The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.
Winston Nesbitt (1981). Compatibilism - Reply to Locke. Mind 90 (February):435-440.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.
Wayne A. Davis (1991). The World-Shift Theory of Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.
Shaun Nichols (2008). Great Philosophical Debates. Teaching Co..
Robert H. Kane (2002). Free Will, Determinism, and Indeterminism. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic 371--406.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #252,022 of 1,780,773 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #290,888 of 1,780,773 )
How can I increase my downloads?