Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Investigations 8 (January):1-16 (1985)
|Abstract||According to kripke, Wittgenstein denied certain beliefs about meaning and other minds. But who holds these beliefs? we do "not" believe that "all future applications" of a word are "determined"; nor that "i give directions to myself"; nor that something has to "constitute" meaning. Such beliefs are distortions by realist philosophers; it needs no sceptic to deny them. Wittgenstein's "sympathy with the solipsist" is an illusion, Due to misreadings (and mistranslations) of the text. Wittgenstein's position is clear and does not need kripke's revision|
|Keywords||Epistemology Scepticism Kripke, S Wittgenstein|
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