David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (1):13-36 (2008)
The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub-traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and the soul, the modern definition of death as "brain death," and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre-modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans-cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years
|Keywords||brain death spirit soul personhood Ibn Qayyim al‐Jawziyya Ibn Sina (Avicenna) organ transplantation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Chris Durante (2009). Agreeing to Disagree: Indigenous Pluralism From Human Rights to Bioethics. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (3):513-529.
Ebrahim Moosa (2012). Translating Neuroethics: Reflections From Muslim Ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):519-528.
Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde (2013). Brain-Dead Patients Are Not Cadavers: The Need to Revise the Definition of Death in Muslim Communities. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 25 (1):25-45.
Mohamed Rady, Joseph Verheijde & Muna Ali (2009). Islam and End-of-Life Practices in Organ Donation for Transplantation: New Questions and Serious Sociocultural Consequences. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 21 (2):175-205.
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