Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties

Abstract
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications.
Keywords Antinatalism  Benatar  Having children  Having kids  Morality of procreation  Prima Facie duties  Ethics of procreation  Reproductive ethics  Parenthood
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