David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 38 (3):555-568 (2010)
Cases involving certain kinds of manipulation seem to challenge compatibilism about responsibility-grounding free will. To deal with such cases many compatibilists give what has become known as a âsoft lineâ reply. In this paper I present a challenge to the soft line reply. I argue that any relevant case involving manipulationâand to which a compatibilist might wish to give a soft line replyâcan be transformed into one supporting a degree of moral responsibility through the addition of libertarian elements (such as alternative possibilities of a kind unavailable under determinism and executive control of the sort commonly associated with agent-causation). From a compatibilistâs perspective the subtraction of libertarian elements should make no difference to any assessment of the agentâs responsibility. The compatibilist should therefore judge the agent morally responsible after the removal of the libertarian elements. Yet removal of the libertarian elements returns the case to its original form and thus what started out as a soft line has now collapsed into a hard line reply. Various ways of resisting my argument are considered, but each is shown to carry important burdens
|Keywords||Free Will Responsibility Control Soft Line Compatibilism Hard Line Incompatibilism Libertarianism Manipulation|
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Berofsky (2002). Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Randolph Clarke (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (2002). Reply to TM Scanlon. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. Mit Press, Bradford Books. 184--188.
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