David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107 (1995)
Information processing theories in psychology give rise to executive theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine the arguments from theoretical computational considerations that cognitive psychologists use to support their general approach in order to show that they make unwarranted assumptions about the processing attributes of consciousness. I then go on to examine the assumptions behind executive theories which grow out of the computer metaphor of cognitive psychology and conclude that we may not be the sort of computational machine cognitive psychology assumes and that cognitive psychology''s approach in itself does not buy us anything in developing theories of consciousness. Hence, the state space in which we may locate consciousness is vast, even within an information processing framework
|Keywords||Computation Consciousness Information Machine Psychology Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mariam Thalos (2008). On Planning: Toward a Natural History of Goal Attainment. Philosophical Papers 37 (2):289-317.
Similar books and articles
Anthony P. Atkinson, Michael S. C. Thomas & Axel Cleeremans (2000). Consciousness: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
Max Velmans (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.
Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness Without Conflation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino (2011). Information Processing, Computation, and Cognition. Journal of Biological Physics 37 (1):1-38.
John R. Christie & John Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads71 ( #25,671 of 1,692,210 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,557 of 1,692,210 )
How can I increase my downloads?