Arguments from design: A self-defeating strategy?
Philosophia 33 (1-4):297-317 (2005)
| Abstract | In this article, after reviewing traditional arguments from design, I consider some more recent versions: the so-called ‘new design arguments’ for the existence of God. These arguments enjoy an apparent advantage over the traditional arguments from design by avoiding some of Hume’s famous criticisms. However, in seeking to render religion and science compatible, it seems that they require a modification not only of our scientific understanding but also of the traditional conception of God. Moreover, there is a key problem with arguments from design that Mill raised to which the new arguments seem no less vulnerable than the older versions. The view that science and religion are complementary has at least one significant advantage over other positions, such as the view that they are in an antagonistic relationship or the view that they are so incommensurable that they are neither complementary nor antagonistic. The advantage is that it aspires to provide a unified worldview that is sensitive to the claims of both science and religion. And surely, such a worldview, if available, would seem to be superior to one in which, say, scientific and religious claims were held despite their obvious contradictions. Given this, it should come as no surprise that many religious thinkers have been attracted to the view that science and religion are complementary. Here, I wish to consider a cluster of arguments exemplifying this position: namely, ‘new design arguments’ for the existence of God. These arguments rely directly on developments in late twentieth-century natural science in attempting to establish their conclusions. One question that will need to be addressed is: To what extent are they susceptible to the criticism that they only succeed by distorting the religious beliefs they claim to champion? But before we examine new design arguments, it would be wise to consider first of 1 all the traditional arguments from design, and note some of the problems they have faced.. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesKevin Mongrain (2009). The Eyes of Faith. Newman Studies Journal 6 (1):68-86.
David B. Myers (2000). New Design Arguments: Old Millian Objections. Religious Studies 36 (2):141-162.
Elliott Sober (2004). The Design Argument. In William Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell Pub..
Kenneth Einar Himma, Design Arguments for the Existence of God. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Greg Bamford (1991). Design, Science and Conceptual Analysis. In Jim Plume (ed.), Architectural Science and Design in Harmony: Proceedings of the joint ANZAScA / ADTRA conference, Sydney, 10-12 July, 1990. School of Architecture, University of NSW.
Graham Oppy (1996). Hume and the Argument for Biological Design. Biology and Philosophy 11 (4):519-534.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2005). The Application-Conditions for Design Inferences: Why the Design Arguments Need the Help of Other Arguments for God's Existence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (1):1 - 33.
David Glass (2012). Darwin, Design and Dawkins' Dilemma. Sophia 51 (1):31-57.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads7 ( #134,900 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
