Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (3):297-311 (1999)
|Abstract||This paper argues that, as all available accounts of how scientific and non-scientific goals might be distinguished rely upon distinctions as much in need of explication as the notion of scientific goals itself, naturalized accounts of science should reject the notion that there are characteristically scientific goals for a given time and place and instead countenance only the goals which happen to be had by individual scientists or their communities. This argument and the recommendation that follows from it are illustrated by reference to Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA.|
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