Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses
Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365 (1983)
| Abstract | It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses. | |||||||||
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