Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365 (1983)
It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Moehler (forthcoming). The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Daniel Steel (2015). Acceptance, Values, and Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.
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John C. Harsanyi (1985). Acceptance of Empirical Statements: A Bayesian Theory Without Cognitive Utilities. Theory and Decision 18 (1):1-30.
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R. Festa (1993). Optimum Inductive Methods. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
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