Bayesian Networks in Philosophy
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Benedikt Löwe, Wolfgang Malzkorn & Thoralf Räsch (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences II: Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics. Kluwer 39-46 (2002)
There is a long philosophical tradition of addressing questions in philosophy of science and epistemology by means of the tools of Bayesian probability theory (see Earman (1992) and Howson and Urbach (1993)). In the late '70s, an axiomatic approach to conditional independence was developed within a Bayesian framework. This approach in conjunction with developments in graph theory are the two pillars of the theory of Bayesian Networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. The theory has been very successful over the last two decades and has found a wide array of applications ranging from medical diagnosis to safety systems for hazardous industries.
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