David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 165 (3):921-937 (2013)
Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispensible tool for research on cognitive processes since it reveals that there are some folk concepts, like belief and desire, whose functional roles must be preserved rather than eliminated by future scientific explanations. Some naturalists have recently challenged this indispensability argument, though the point of that challenge has been blunted by a mutual conflation of metaphysical and methodological strands of naturalism. I argue that the naturalist’s challenge to the indispensability argument, like naturalism itself, ought to be reformulated as a strictly methodological thesis. So understood, the challenge succeeds by showing (1) that we cannot know a priori on the basis of conceptual analysis of folk platitudes that something must occupy the functional roles specified for beliefs and desires, and (2) that proponents of Canberra Functionalism sometimes tacitly concede this point by treating substantive psychological theories as the deliverances of a priori platitudes analysis
|Keywords||Canberra Plan Naturalism Conceptual analysis Philosophical psychology Philosophical methodology Folk psychology Beliefs and desires Platitudes analysis Neuroscience Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton (1992). Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends. Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan McKeown-Green & Justine Kingsbury (2009). Jackson's Armchair : The Only Chair in Town? In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press
Per Sandin (2006). Has Psychology Debunked Conceptual Analysis? Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33.
Glenn Branch (2002). In Defense of Methodological Naturalism. Philo 5 (2):249-255.
Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.
Konrad Banicki (2012). Connective Conceptual Analysis and Psychology. Theory and Psychology 22 (3):310-323.
Dustin Locke (2009). A Partial Defense of Ramseyan Humility. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press
Piotr Bylica & Dariusz Sagan (2008). God, Design, and Naturalism: Implications of Methodological Naturalism in Science for Science–Religion Relation. Pensamiento 64 (242):621-38.
David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
Alexander Paseau (2008). Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
William Ramsey (1992). Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis. Topoi 11 (1):59-70.
Janet Levin (2013). Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism. Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.
Warren Schmaus (1996). The Empirical Character of Methodological Rules. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):106.
Erica Burman (1991). What Discourse is Not. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):325-342.
Added to index2012-08-01
Total downloads66 ( #64,837 of 1,906,981 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #129,680 of 1,906,981 )
How can I increase my downloads?