Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Harnad accepts the picture of computation as formalism, so that any implementation of a program - thats any implementation - is as good as any other; in fact, in considering claims about the properties of computations, the nature of the implementing system - the interpreter - is invisible. Let me refer to this idea as 'Computationalism'. Almost all the criticism, claimed refutation by Searle's argument, and sharp contrasting of this idea with others, rests on the absoluteness of this separation between a computational system and its implementation.|
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Similar books and articles
Stevan Harnad (1994). Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't. Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
Nir Fresco (2008). An Analysis of the Criteria for Evaluating Adequate Theories of Computation. Minds and Machines 18 (3):379-401.
Steffen Borge (2007). A Modal Defence of Strong AI. In Dermot Moran Stephen Voss (ed.), Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 6. The Philosophical Society of Turkey.
David J. Chalmers (1994). On Implementing a Computation. Minds and Machines 4 (4):391-402.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (1972). What Computers Can't Do. Harper and Row.
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