Change in View

MIT Press (1986)
Abstract
Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book
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ISBN(s) 0262580918
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Paul Boghossian (2012). What is Inference? Philosophical Studies (1):1-18.

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