David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 37 (4):589-604 (2009)
The aim of this article is to give both a sustained interpretation of Wittgenstein’s obscure remarks on the experience of meaning of language, synthaesthesia and secondary use and to apply his insights to recent philosophical discussions about synthaesthesia. I argue that synthaesthesia and experience of meaning are conceptually related to aspect-seeing. The concept of aspect-seeing is not reducible to either seeing or imaging but involves a modified notion of experience. Likewise, synthaesthesia involves a modified notion of experience. In particular, the concept of synthaesthesia involves a secondary use of ‘experience’ and hence is intrinsically dependent on the primary use of language. Recent discussions tend to overlook this distinction between the primary and secondary use of language
|Keywords||Wittgenstein Synaesthesia Aspect-seeing Neuroscience Ramachandran Experience of meaning Imaging McGinn|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
William James (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Stanley Cavell (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford University Press.
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2001). Synaesthesia: A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (12):3-34.
Anina N. Rich, John L. Bradshaw & Jason B. Mattingley (2005). A Systematic, Large-Scale Study of Synaesthesia: Implications for the Role of Early Experience in Lexical-Colour Associations. Cognition 98 (1):53-84.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Pickering (2013). Extending Disorder: Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Secondary Sense. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195.
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