David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 37 (4):589-604 (2009)
The aim of this article is to give both a sustained interpretation of Wittgenstein’s obscure remarks on the experience of meaning of language, synthaesthesia and secondary use and to apply his insights to recent philosophical discussions about synthaesthesia. I argue that synthaesthesia and experience of meaning are conceptually related to aspect-seeing. The concept of aspect-seeing is not reducible to either seeing or imaging but involves a modified notion of experience. Likewise, synthaesthesia involves a modified notion of experience. In particular, the concept of synthaesthesia involves a secondary use of ‘experience’ and hence is intrinsically dependent on the primary use of language. Recent discussions tend to overlook this distinction between the primary and secondary use of language
|Keywords||Wittgenstein Synaesthesia Aspect-seeing Neuroscience Ramachandran Experience of meaning Imaging McGinn|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Stanley Cavell (1979/1999). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford University Press.
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2001). Synaesthesia: A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (12):3-34.
Anina N. Rich, John L. Bradshaw & Jason B. Mattingley (2005). A Systematic, Large-Scale Study of Synaesthesia: Implications for the Role of Early Experience in Lexical-Colour Associations. Cognition 98 (1):53-84.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Pickering (2013). Extending Disorder: Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Secondary Sense. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195.
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