David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Computational Intelligence 9 (4):337-339 (1993)
The problem seems apparent even in Glasgow's term ``depict'', which is used by way of contrast with ``describe''. Now ``describe'' refers relatively unproblematically to strings of symbols, such as those in this written sentence, that are systematically interpretable as propositions describing objects, events, or states of affairs. But what does ``depict'' mean? In the case of a picture -- whether a photo or a diagram -- it is clear what depict means. A picture is an object (I will argue below that it is an analog object, relative to what it is a picture of) and it DEPICTS yet another object: the object it is a picture OF. But in the case of an array, whether described formally, with numerical coordinates, or stored in a machine, or ``depicted'' diagrammatically by way of a secondary illustration, it is not at all clear whether the entity in question is indeed a picture, or merely yet another set of symbols that is INTERPRETABLE as referring to a picture, which picture in turn depicts an object! It is clear that we are dealing with many layers of interpretation here already, and so far we are still talking only about external objects (such as pictures, symbols and objects simpliciter). We still have not gotten to MENTAL objects, such as mental ``images''
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark Johnston (2004). The Obscure Object of Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
Stevan Harnad (1994). Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't. Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 474--493.
Markus Raab & Marc Boschker (2002). Time Matters! Implications From Mentally Imaged Motor Actions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):208-209.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2003). Return of the Mental Image: Are There Really Pictures in the Brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):113-118.
Robert N. Audi (1978). The Ontological Status of Mental Images. Inquiry 21 (1-4):348-61.
Catharine Abell & Gregory Currie (1999). Internal and External Pictures. Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #101,240 of 1,096,213 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #126,669 of 1,096,213 )
How can I increase my downloads?