David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359 (2010)
Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much reduced and second-order skepticism is generated. Since this is the case in both skeptical and everyday contexts, contextualism cannot resolve the paradox.
|Keywords||fallibilism contextualism epistemic luck knowledge second-order skepticism truth Brains in Vats relevant alternatives|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1998). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge.
Stewart Cohen (2000). Contextualism and Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):94-107.
Stewart Cohen (2001). Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):87 - 98.
Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
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