David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):483-498 (2010)
Research on folk epistemology usually takes place within one of two different paradigms. The first is centered on epistemic theories or, in other words, the way people think about knowledge. The second is centered on epistemic intuitions, that is, the way people intuitively distinguish knowledge from belief. In this paper, we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the connection between the two paradigms, as well as to the mechanisms that underlie the use of both epistemic intuitions and theories. We contend that research on folk epistemology must examine the use of both intuitions and theories in the pragmatic context of the game of giving and asking for reasons and, more generally, understand how these practices take place within the broader context of normative social cognition
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Science Developmental Psychology Epistemology Neurosciences Cognitive Psychology Philosophy of Mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2014). Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias. Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.
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