Field on the Normative Role of Logic

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):333 - 335 (2009)
Abstract
I begin by summarizing the first two chapters of (Harman 1986). The first chapter stresses the importance of not confusing inference with implication and of not confusing reasoning with the sort of argument studied in deductive logic. Inference and reasoning are psychological events or processes that can be done more or less well. The sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with relations among propositions and with structures of propositions distinguished into premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion. Deductive logic is not a particular psychological subject and is not a particularly normative subject, although one might attempt to develop a logic of belief or a deontic logic, for example.
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Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
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