David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Heythrop Journal 48 (5):685–696 (2007)
There have been a number of developments within religious epistemology in recent years. Currently, the dominant view within mainstream philosophy of religion is, arguably, reformed epistemology. What is less well known is that feminist epistemologists have also been active recently within the philosophy of religion, advancing new perspectives from which to view the link between knowledge and religious experience. In this article I examine the claim by certain feminist religious epistemologists that women are both epistemically oppressed and epistemically privileged, and I consider whether or not this justifies the specific re‐conceptualisations of religious terms that such epistemologists have proposed
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Elizabeth D. Burns (2012). Is There a Distinctively Feminist Philosophy of Religion? Philosophy Compass 7 (6):422-435.
Ben Kotzee (2010). Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege. Argumentation 24 (3):265-281.
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