David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):12-78 (1993)
Harnad's main argument can be roughly summarised as follows: due to Searle's Chinese Room argument, symbol systems by themselves are insufficient to exhibit cognition, because the symbols are not grounded in the real world, hence without meaning. However, a symbol system that is connected to the real world through transducers receiving sensory data, with neural nets translating these data into sensory categories, would not be subject to the Chinese Room argument. Harnad's article is not only the starting point for the present debate, but is also a contribution to a longlasting discussion about such questions as: Can a computer think? If yes, would this be solely by virtue of its program? Is the Turing Test appropriate for deciding whether a computer thinks?
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Citations of this work BETA
Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Computation, Among Other Things, is Beneath Us. Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.
Stevan Harnad (1994). Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't. Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
Donald Favareau (2015). Symbols Are Grounded Not in Things, but in Scaffolded Relations and Their Semiotic Constraints. Biosemiotics 8 (2):235-255.
Jacob Feldman (2012). Symbolic Representation of Probabilistic Worlds. Cognition 123 (1):61-83.
Pierre De Loor, Kristen Manac’H. & Jacques Tisseau (2009). Enaction-Based Artificial Intelligence: Toward Co-Evolution with Humans in the Loop. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (3):319-343.
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