Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Harnad's main argument can be roughly summarised as follows: due to Searle's Chinese Room argument, symbol systems by themselves are insufficient to exhibit cognition, because the symbols are not grounded in the real world, hence without meaning. However, a symbol system that is connected to the real world through transducers receiving sensory data, with neural nets translating these data into sensory categories, would not be subject to the Chinese Room argument. Harnad's article is not only the starting point for the present debate, but is also a contribution to a longlasting discussion about such questions as: Can a computer think? If yes, would this be solely by virtue of its program? Is the Turing Test appropriate for deciding whether a computer thinks?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stevan Harnad (1995). Grounding Symbols in Sensorimotor Categories with Neural Networks. Institute of Electrical Engineers Colloquium on "Grounding Representations.
Drew McDermott (2001). The Digital Computer as Red Herring. Psycoloquy 12 (54).
Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. 2 (3):217-238.
C. Franklin Boyle (2001). Transduction and Degree of Grounding. Psycoloquy 12 (36).
Stevan Harnad, Symbol Grounding is an Empirical Problem: Neural Nets Are Just a Candidate Component.
Stevan Harnad (1992). Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.), Connectionism in Context. Springer-Verlag.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #95,712 of 740,480 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,533 of 740,480 )
How can I increase my downloads?