Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling?
_Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the_That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" (whether veridical, illusory, or otherwise) but an "aesthesiogenic" one: How and why are there any feelings at all?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kirk Ludwig (2003). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 1--46.
Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Robert Kirk (1993). "The Best Set of Tools"? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):335-43.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #35,925 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?