Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem
Graduate studies at Western
Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling?
_Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the_That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" (whether veridical, illusory, or otherwise) but an "aesthesiogenic" one: How and why are there any feelings at all?
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Similar books and articles
Robert Kirk (1993). "The Best Set of Tools"? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):335-43.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.
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