David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axiomathes 20 (4):461-478 (2010)
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’. I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach: defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality. I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account.
|Keywords||Extrinsic Intrinsic Relations Essentiality Qualitativeness|
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
G. E. Moore (1903/2004). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
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