David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192 (2011)
Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the following claims: (1) one cannot have faith, (2) one has an obligation to have faith, and (3) ought implies can. To solve this dilemma, I offer three solutions that I believe have the philosophical resources to demonstrate the consistency of these claims. Thus, I defend the claim that it is logically possible for a person to be culpable for an involuntary failure to have faith in God
|Keywords||Faith Trust Doxastic Involuntarism|
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
William Lane Craig (2006). Ducking Friendly Fire: Davidson on the Grounding Objection. Philosophia Christi 8 (1):161-166.
William Lane Craig (2001). Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the "Grounding Objection". Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):337-352.
Paul Helm (2000). Faith with Reason. Oxford University Press.
John Hick (1989). An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. Yale University Press.
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