Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615 (1982)
|Abstract||Many realists have maintained that the success of scientific theories can be explained only if they may be regarded as approximately true. Laurens Laudan has in turn contended that a necessary condition for a theory's being approximately true is that its central terms refer, and since many successful theories of the past have employed central terms which we now understand to be non-referential, realism cannot explain their success. The present paper argues that a realist can adopt a view of reference according to which a theory might plausibly be said to be approximately true even though its central terms do not refer, or alternatively, he may construe reference in such a way as to assign reference to a range of successful older theories which includes Laudan's purported counterexamples|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jerrold L. Aronson (1989). Testing for Convergent Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):255-259.
Jacob Busch (2008). No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks. Theoria 74 (2):102-114.
Gerald Doppelt (2007). Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
James W. McAllister (1993). Scientific Realism and the Criteria for Theory-Choice. Erkenntnis 38 (2):203 - 222.
Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Antonio Diéguez-Lucena (2006). Why Does Laudan's Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37 (2):393 - 403.
Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
Seungbae Park (2011). Coherence of Our Best Scientific Theories. Foundations of Science 16 (1):21-30.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads69 ( #12,955 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #13,107 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?