Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):367-82 (1994)
|Abstract||In his Explaining Behavior, Fred Dretske uses a reliabilist theory of representation to try to vindicate the use of intentional explanation for behaviour against latter-day elitninativism. Although Dretske's indicator semantics turns on the notion of function, he himself never explicitly defines what function means. Dretske's reticence in discussing function may ultimately be an error, for, as I argue, his implicit understanding of what a function amounts to does not fit with data from op rant conditioning. Still, this need not be a deep flaw in Dretske and I offer one way in which we may patch up the notion of function via the changes known to occur with learning in the brain. Ultimately, I conclude that the only facts needed to explain behaviour are (1) the conditions in the world that are paired with neuronal circuit activation (as picked out by goals in some circumstances); and (2) what motor output that condition triggers|
|Keywords||Behavior Language Psychology Science Semantics Dretske, F|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
S. R. Sullivan (1993). From Natural Function to Indeterminate Content. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):129-37.
Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Dretske on Explaining Behavior. Acta Analytica 11 (11):111-124.
Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske's Replies. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behavior. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
B. Hassrick (1995). Fred Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Semantic Content. Conference 6 (1):59-66.
Constantine Sandis (2008). Dretske on the Causation of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
D. Sturdee (1997). The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske's Account of Representational Content. Erkenntnis 47 (1):89-104.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1992). Indication and Adaptation. Synthese 92 (2):283-312.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #87,931 of 549,093 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,093 )
How can I increase my downloads?