Impossible worlds and knowledge of necessary truths
| Abstract | I propose that safety and sensitivity conditionals may be used to explain the reliability of beliefs in necessary truths, by appeal to a non-standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents and necessarily true consequents. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesIra Georgia Kiourti (2010). Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility. Dissertation, University of St Andrews
Francesco Berto (2009). Impossible Worlds. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009).
Charles G. Morgan (1973). Systems of Modal Logic for Impossible Worlds. Inquiry 16 (1-4):280 – 289.
Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2013). Remarks on Counterpossibles. Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
Jens Christian Bjerring (2010). Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces. Dissertation, Australian National University
Edward N. Zalta (1997). A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660.
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