Moral particularism and transduction

Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55 (2005)
Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. This result carries over to moral transduction, although it is a difficult empirical issue whether people actually engage in any sort of transduction, including moral transduction.
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    Andrew Cullison (2010). Moral Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    Xavier Parent (2011). Moral Particularism in the Light of Deontic Logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (2-3):75-98.
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