Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55 (2005)
|Abstract||Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. This result carries over to moral transduction, although it is a difficult empirical issue whether people actually engage in any sort of transduction, including moral transduction.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kenneth R. Westphal (2012). ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’. Theory and Research in Education 10 (1):3--25.
Benedict Smith (2010). Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons. Palgrave Macmillan.
Pekka Väyrynen (2011). Moral Particularism. In Christian B. Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.) (2008). Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.
Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Usable Moral Principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.
Mary Tjiattas (2007). Against Moral Particularism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-24.
Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press.
C. Franklin Boyle (2001). Transduction and Degree of Grounding. Psycoloquy 12 (36).
Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2008). Preempting Principles: Recent Debates in Moral Particularism. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1177-1192.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads44 ( #29,783 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?