Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:315 - 331 (1999)
|Abstract||Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error'. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits (virtues, vices, etc.) in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Webber (2007). Character, Common-Sense, and Expertise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (1):89 - 104.
Steven M. Samuels & William D. Casebeer (2005). A Social Psychological View of Morality: Why Knowledge of Situational Influences on Behaviour Can Improve Character Development Practices. Journal of Moral Education 34 (1):73-87.
Gilbert Harman (2003). No Character or Personality. Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (1):87-94.
Chris Tucker (2005). Harman Vs. Virtue Theory. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):137-145.
Gilbert Harman (2009). Skepticism About Character Traits. Journal of Ethics 13 (2/3):235 - 242.
Peter J. Taylor (1994). Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304 - 310.
Christian Miller (2009). Empathy, Social Psychology, and Global Helping Traits. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):247 - 275.
Candace L. Upton (2009). Situational Traits of Character: Dispositional Foundations and Implications for Moral Psychology and Friendship. Lexington Books.
John Campbell (1999). Can Philosophical Accounts of Altruism Accommodate Experimental Data on Helping Behaviour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.
H. E. Baber (1987). How Bad Is Rape? Hypatia 2 (2):125 - 138.
Michael DePaul (2000). Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:141-157.
Mark Alfano (2011). Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even If It Isn't). Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):121-136.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads122 ( #4,099 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)33 ( #1,274 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?