Metaphysical realism and moral relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's reason, truth and history

Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):568-575 (1982)
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DOI 10.2307/2026318
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Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer (1988). A Putnam's Progress. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):459-473.
Riccardo Viale (1999). Causal Cognition and Causal Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):151 – 167.

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Gordon Steinhoff (1986). Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
Mark Sprevak & Christina McLeish (2004). Magic, Semantics, and Putnam's Vat Brains. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (2):227-236.
Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.

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