Moral relativism defended

Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22 (1975)
Abstract
Gilbert harman has recently proposed a version of moral relativism which is markedly clearer than any earlier statement of that position. Besides consistency and clarity, Harman claims for his thesis a number of positive virtues. The thesis, He argues, "helps explain otherwise puzzling aspects of our moral views"; it accounts for "a previously unnoticed distinction between inner and non-Inner judgments"' and it allows us to meet traditional objections to related theories. In this paper, I argue that none of these alleged virtues is adequately documented by harman's arguments
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    Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
    Russ Shafer-Landau (2009). A Defence of Categorical Reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):189-206.
    Nicholas Southwood (2009). Moral Contractualism. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.

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