Neville’s Metaphysics

American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 37 (3):248-262 (2016)
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Abstract

The goal of this essay is three fold: first, to describe briefly the “sublation thesis”; second, to show how Robert Neville’s Philosophical Theology evades the thesis; and, third, to assess the compatibility of Neville’s metaphysics and pragmatic naturalism. Traditionally, the philosophy of religion addresses a small bundle of interrelated issues: arguments regarding the existence, nature, and knowledge of God, the rationality of belief, and the problem of evil. Early modern forms of the philosophy of religion also address the immortality of the soul and the possibility of miracles. All of these issues ride the back, so to speak, of confessional theological concerns. The sublation thesis is an idea regarding the...

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